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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Radio Frequency Retroreflector Attack
Electromagnetic side-channel attacks are attacks performed by passively measuring the electro-
magnetic emanation originating from a target device. An attacker can reconstruct the original
signal by analyzing the measured radio wave. Although there have been many studies on pas-
sive electromagnetic side-channel attacks [1, 2, 3, 4], few works have been performed on active
electromagnetic side-channel attacks [5, 6]. In [5], Anderson mentioned that some of these
methods were already known to the intelligence community; in particular, he mentioned the
reports that the CIA uses software-based radio frequency (RF) exploits in economic espionage
against certain European countries.
The NSA advanced network technology (ANT) catalog [7] is a classified document that lists
several surveillance technologies used by the United States National Security Agency (NSA).
The catalog was included in the series of documents leaked by Edward Snowden in December
2013. Among the technologies listed in the catalog, the technology called ANGRYNEIGH-
BOR and its variants are attack methods based on the principle of the RF retroreflector attack
(RFRA), which is an active electromagnetic side-channel attack. An attacker actively irradi-
ates the target device with a radio wave at a resonant frequency and passively monitors the
reflected radio wave from the target device. As the attacker has embedded a malicious circuit
(retroreflector) into the target device, the reflected wave is modulated by the target signal, and
the attacker can read the target signal from the reflected wave. It is noteworthy that there was
an ancestor of ANGRYNEIGHBOR, called “The Thing” [8], which is a technique to transmit
an audio signal by making use of electromagnetic energy taken from an outside source. The
technique had been used for intelligence activity in the mid-twentieth century.
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After the NSA ANT catalog was leaked, several researchers have started to recreate the
surveillance tools using opensource hardware and software [9, 10]. In DEF CON 22 [11],
Michael Ossmann successfully demonstrated that RFRA could be implemented with an off-
the-shelf SDR (HackRF One) and a simple RF retroreflector, and an attacker can read the
keystroke remotely by applying the attack to a PS/2 keyboard. The efforts are fully described
in one of the NSA Playset projects [9]. A researcher from the Green Bay Professional Packet
Radio (GBPPR) [10] also demonstrated that RFRA could be implemented with their radio
wave devices [12, 13].
1.2 The purpose of this study
Although the prior works have successfully demonstrated the threat of RFRA, success condi-
tions have not been revealed. Given this background in mind, we aim to answer the following
simple research question:
RQ “Is the RFRA a feasible attack?”
To answer this question, we adopt a systematical approach. We first create a simple RF
retroreflector that is made from a coaxial cable. We embed a field-effect transistor (FET) chip
in the cable and make its woven copper shield work as a dipole antenna. This setup can be
seen as a generic form of an RF retroreflector. We then generate electric waveforms in the
retroreflector using a function generator connected to it. Using SDR equipment, we irradiate
the retroreflector with a radio wave at a resonant frequency of the reflector’s antenna and
analyze the reflected radio wave from the reflector. Finally, we embed a reflector into a USB
keyboard cable and test whether typed key inputs can be reverted from the observed signals
of a reflected radio wave.
The key findings we derived from the field experiments with an off-the-shelf SDR (USRP
N210) and a laptop PC are summarized as follows:
• RFRA succeeded with the distance of 10 meters between an attacker and a target device.
• RFRA successfully read the internal signal of 10 Mbps, which was roughly half of the
maximum rate of the SDR processing capability.
• RFRA successfully read what key was pressed on an RFRA-installed USB keyboard,
which is connected with the low-speed mode (1.5 Mbps).
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These findings suggest that the RFRA threat is real, and we need to develop effective
countermeasures against it. Through our experiments, we conjecture that an attacker equipped
with a hardware device instead of SDR will be able to target a higher frequency of internal
signals, e.g., USB high-speed. We note that the total amount of our setup was USD 5,000,
which would be affordable for non-professional attackers.
I delivered this research as some papers [14, 15, 16]. Particularly, [14] was awarded as Best
Student Paper at WOOT ’18. Also [16] was awarded as Student Paper Award.
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RFRA Mechanism
In this chapter, we briefly describe the mechanism of RFRA. The core of an RFRA lies in the
retroreflector embedded into a target device. Figure 2.1 shows the structure of a retroreflector,
which includes an FET chip and a dipole antenna. Figure 2.2 presents its actual implementa-
tion using a coaxial cable, where the gate of the FET is attached to the copper core, and the
source and drain of the FET are connected to a woven copper shield, which works as a dipole
antenna. The victim’s target signal will go through the copper core, which is received by the
gate of FET.
As shown in Figure 2.3, an attacker irradiates radio waves to the circuit and attempts to
analyze the reflected radio wave, which is AM-modulated with the target signal. Let’s see why
the reflected radio wave is AM-modulated with the target signal. First, the current is induced
when the dipole antenna receives the carrier wave, which is transmitted by an attacker. The
FET controls the induced current proportionally to the voltage of the target signal applied to
the gate. Therefore, the generated current on the antenna becomes an AM signal modulated
by the target signal. The dipole antenna radiates radio waves according to the AM signal.
Figure 2.1: A RF retroreflector that includes a FET chip and a dipole antenna.
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Figure 2.2: An implementation of the RF retroreflector using a coaxial cable.
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Finally, the attacker will demodulate the AM signal to revert the original target signal.
We note that the resonant frequency is determined by the length of dipole antenna; i.e.,
when any odd multiple of half wavelength equals to the length of antenna. In our experiments,
the length of the dipole antenna was set to 1 m, which corresponds to the resonant frequency
of 599.6 MHz. However, this assumes that the shape of the target is linear. Actually, the
resonance frequency varies depending on the shape of the target and also varies depending
on the circuit of the device connected to the target. Therefore, it is difficult to calculate and
predict the resonance frequency, and it is necessary to find the resonance frequency by changing
the frequency of the radio wave to be irradiated.
Figure 2.3: Overview of an RFRA attack.
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Feasibility of the RFRA
In this chapter, we study the feasibility of the RFRA using a generic implementation, which
consists of a MOSFET chip and a 1 m coaxial cable. We evaluate the feasibility from the
viewpoints of the distance to the target and the frequency of the target signal.
3.1 Design of the experiment
Figure 3.1 represents the experimental setup. The RF reflector is connected to a function
generator that generates the target’s signal. Two directional antennas are connected to an SDR
(USRP). The antennas and the target reflector are placed on cardboard boxes at controlled
distances. The reflector’s antenna cable is set up straightened. Table 3.1 summarizes the
instruments used in our experiments, and Table 3.2 lists the software and specs of the PC used
for the SDR.
Table 3.1: Instruments used in the experiments.
Instrument Model
Antenna Ettus Research LP0410
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) USRP N210
Function generator AFG3102
Oscilloscope MSO4054
Attacker PC ASUS ROG G752VS
FET (attached to the target) ATF-54143
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Figure 3.1: Experimental setup (overview).
Table 3.2: List of software and PC used for SDR.
OS Windows 10
SDR software toolkit GNU Radio 3.7.11
CPU Core i7 7700HQ 2.8GHz/4 Core
RAM 32GB
3.2 Distance between the attacker and the target
We first investigate the effective range of an RFRA. To this end, we change the distance
between the TX/RX antennas (on the attacker’s side) and the reflector. The power of the
irradiated radio waves is set to the maximum intensity of the USRP. The frequency of the
irradiated waves ranges from 590 MHz to 680 MHz, which roughly corresponds to the resonant
frequency of the target’s antenna1. We let the target signal be a digital signal that repeats the
10-bits pattern “1101010010.” The voltage of the signal is set to 3 Vpp. The transmission rate
of the target signal is set to 2 Mbps, and the sampling rate of the USRP is set to 10 MS/s.
Figure 3.2 shows the measured waveforms for distances of 1 m, 3 m, 5 m, 7 m, 10 m, and
11 m. ‘0’s and ‘1’s present the decoded bits. The numbers shown above/below the middle
line indicate the correctly/incorrectly estimated bits. The attack succeeds when the distance
is less than or equal to 10 m. Note that for the case of 10 m, we show the result where 2 of 31
1As the actual resonant frequency was sensitive to the placement of the target, we manually adjusted the
frequency for each trial.
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bits are detected as errors. However, the attack succeeds to read most of the original signals
in the 10 m case. At the distance of 11 m, however, we observe no signals (we did not have the
way to decode). From these results, we conclude that RFRA is effective within the distance
of 10 m, which is long enough to make the attack practical in many scenarios.
3.3 Transmission rate of the target signal
Next, we examine the highest transmission rate of the target signal, at which the RFRA attack
is effective. The distance between the antennas and the target reflector is fixed to 1 m. The
USRP sampling rate is set to 25 MS/s. The transmission rate of the target signal is set to
1 Mbps, 5 Mbps, 10 Mbps, and 20 Mbps. Figure 3.3 shows the results (the case for 20 Mbps
is omitted). The frequency of the irradiated wave is set to 771.2 MHz.
After several trials, we find that RFRA can read signals up to 10 Mbps. USRP N210 has the
maximum sampling rate of 25 MS/s2. Theoretically, with this sampling rate, it is possible to
read a signal below 12.5 MHz, which corresponds to a transmission rate of 25 Mbps. However,
the experiment fails to read the 20 Mbps signal. Although not conclusive, we conjecture that
this limit is due to hardware performance; i.e., using high-performance hardware can extend
the limitation of RFRA. We leave this issue for our future work. We note that the FET chip
we used is capable of switching to the 6 GHz frequency.
3.4 Summary
We found that using off-the-shelf equipment, approximately 10 m and 10 Mbps are the limits
of the attack. If an attacker can succeed the attack at a distance of 10 m, he/she may have
the flexibility in setting up the attack equipment. Also, as we shall present in the next section,
the speed of 10 Mbps is practical to attack real applications such as a USB keyboard. These
observations support the feasibility of the attack.
We observed that there were several frequency ranges (from 590 MHz to 680 MHz) where
attacks succeed. We also observed that the estimated waveforms had reversed from the original
waveforms. Currently, we do not have a theory that can explain these observations, which
could be affected by multiple factors, such as the EM reflection. Addressing the details of
these observations is left for further study.
2The sampling rate can be configured up to 50 MS/s with the low dynamic range. However, we could not
observe any signals in the low dynamic range.
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Figure 3.2: Measured signals under different distances between the attacker and the target.
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Figure 3.3: Measured waveforms for the target signals with the frequencies of 1 Mbps (top),
5 Mbps (middle), and 10 Mbps (bottom). The upper part of each figure is a waveform measured
by oscilloscope.
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Application of RFRA to eavesdrop on
USB keyboard
As an actual example of RFRA to a real device, we attacked a USB keyboard and evaluated
the attack success rate. As we have shown in Section 3, we have proven that with our setup,
RFRA can be applied to devices that operate under 10 Mbps of the data transmission rate.
USB is a widely used communication protocol. According to the USB standards, the low-speed
mode is used for peripheral equipment such as the keyboard or mouse, and works under the
speed of 10 Mbps. As eavesdropping on an input device could lead to the exposure of private,
sensitive information, we adopted a USB keyboard as the target of our study. We note that
while the experiments shown in the previous section used a simple rectangular waveform, the
attack shown in this section makes use of actual USB protocol, which is much more complex
than the rectangular waveform. Therefore, it becomes difficult for an attacker to tune the
parameters including radio frequency and the direction of antenna; which will lead to the
lower attack success rate, compared to the ideal case shown in the previous section.
4.1 Overview of the attack
In this experiment, we typed keys of a USB keyboard and examined how much keystrokes
could be eavesdropped upon. We defined the attack success rate as the fraction of the number
of characters that were successfully eavesdropped upon over the number of characters typed
on the keyboard. We study how the distance between keyboard and SDR affects the attack
success rate. For simplicity, we decode the observed signal into key types in an oﬄine manner,
not in real-time. USB communication is decoded using Non Return to Zero Inversion (NRZI).
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Figure 4.1: A circuit of RFRA embedded into a USB cable.
We developed a program that converts the observed waveform to binary data, and detects keys
from the binary data.
4.2 Implementing RFRA on a USB cable
We start by briefly reviewing the specifications of a USB cable. A USB cable consists of four
wires and they are shielded [17]. The four wires are denoted as VBUS, D+, D−, and GND,
where D+ and D− transmit signals. VBUS and GND represent power to the bus and ground
(earth), respectively. As the two signal lines transmit the differential signals, they transmit
mutually inverted waveforms. The differential signal transmission can achieve noise-tolerant
data transmission. However, from the viewpoint of eavesdropping, an attacker does not need
to obtain signals from both lines because an attacker can achieve her/his objective even when
the transmission is noisy and the data is not completely decoded. Thus, we pick one of the
two signal lines, D+ or D−, for the target signal and attach an FET chip to that line.
Figure 4.1 presents the circuit of RFRA embedded into an USB cable, where we set D+
as the target signal. We note that if we do not put a resistance between D+ and gate, the
negotiation failed and the keyboard did not operate. After placing a resistance of roughly
1kΩ, we observed that the USB communication succeeded. Figure 4.2 presents a photo of
the implemented RFRA-enabled USB cable. We use a small circuit board because of ease of
implementation. In the real attack, an attacker can implement RFRA using smaller elements
in the manufacturing phase of the cable. The RFRA will be completely embedded into a cable
and no one will notice the existence of RFRA from outside.
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Figure 4.2: A photo of RFRA embedded into a USB cable.
Table 4.1: Additional instruments used in the USB keyboard experiments.
Instrument Model
USB extension cable KU-RAA1
USB Keyboard FKD46AK297
Smartphone Galaxy S6 edge
4.3 Design of the experiment
We attached an FET to an 1 m of USB extension cable and attacked it. An USB Keyboard and
a smartphone is connected via the FET-embedded cable. We manually typed several keys using
the keyboard. The typed letters were saved using a note app running on the smartphone. The
saved letters will be used as the correct key inputs. The success rate is calculated by comparing
the saved letters and decoded letters.
Figure 4.3 presents the overview of the experimental setup. We used the same equipment
shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. Table 4.1 summarises the instruments used additionally in
the USB keyboard experiments. The distance between the target and antennas for the attack
was increased by 0.5 m, starting with the distance of 0.5 m. The distance between the antenna
was adjusted to the best location between 0.5 m and 1.5 m. Antennas and the target were
17
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Figure 4.3: Experiment setup.
placed at the position of 0.7 m height from the floor. The sampling rate of a USRP was set to
10 Mbps, which corresponds to approximately 6.7 sampling points per 1 bit for the USB low-
speed mode. Thus, high enough to be able to decode the observed waveforms into the binary
data. The frequency of the irradiating radio wave was swept from 600 MHz to 900 MHz to
find the best one.
To decode the observed radio wave signals, we built a GNU Radio project showed in
Figure 4.4. It implements a simple AM demodulator. Of the blocks shown in the figure, three
blocks, ‘differential’, ‘decide threshold’, and ‘detect preamble’ are the blocks we developed
to detect preamble of USB signals. We also developed a code that converts the differential
data into binary data and decode the binary data as USB keyboard inputs. For reference,
the GNU Radio project and USB keyboard decoding code are publicly available at https:
//github.com/RFRA-keyboard/.
4.4 Evaluation
In our setup, the longest distance the attack succeeded was 1.5 m. The observed waveforms
at each distance are presented in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, and Figure 4.7. We notice that the
waveform observed at 1.5 m has lower amplitudes and noise effects, compared to the ones
observed at 0.5 m and 1.0 m. However, it was clear enough to be decoded with our code.
18
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Figure 4.4: Composition of GNU Radio blocks used for decoding the observed radio wave
signals.
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000000011100001100000000000000001110100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000011110111
Figure 4.5: Waveform eavesdropped from 0.5 m from the target.
000000011100001100000000000000001110100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000011110111
Figure 4.6: Waveform eavesdropped from 1.0 m from the target.
000000011100001100000000000000001110100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000011110111
Figure 4.7: Waveform eavesdropped from 1.5 m from the target.
Table 4.2 presents the results, i.e., key inference error rate v.s. distance to the target. There
were no errors up to 1.0 m. In 1.5 m, one letter failed to be decoded correctly, resulting the
error rate of 1%. We failed to decode the letters when the distance was 2 m. To be accurate,
we could not detect preamble with our code, so that no information was obtained through
eavesdropping. However, as we have shown in Figure 3.2, it is possible to obtain the original
waveforms up to the distance of 10 m. As the Friis transmission equation shows, the reception
intensity of radio waves in the free space is inversely proportional to the square of the distance.
For this reason, even if there is only a 0.5 m difference, the influence of noise becomes non-
negligible, and our code fails to decode the signal. We expect that by improving our naive
implementation of the decoding algorithm and program, the range of a successful attack will
be increased. Another problem is that finding success conditions, like frequency and position
of antennas, is very difficult. More research on success condition is required.
Finally, we present the examples of input letters and decoded letters in Figure 4.8. The
input letters are an pangram, which is a sentence of letters that contains every alphabet letter
at least once. We note that as we manually inputted the letters, there were typos in the input
letters.
We conclude that an USB keyboard is attackable with the RFRA. Although the range is
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not great, the eavesdropping success rate at 1.5 m of distance was quite high, which suggests
that eavesdropping sensitive information such as passwords is feasible with this attack.
• 0.5 m (no error.)
• my faxed a joke won a paper in the cable tv quiz show. The quick brown fox
jumps oever the lazy dog.
• my faxed a joke won a paper in the cable tv quiz show. The quick brown fox
jumps oever the lazy dog.
• 1.0 m (no error.)
• my faxed joke won a paper in the cable tv show. The quick brown fox jumps over
the lazy dog.
• my faxed joke won a paper in the cable tv show. The quick brown fox jumps over
the lazy dog.
• 1.5 m (one error.)
• my faxed joke won a paper in the cable tv quiz show. The quick brown fox jumps
over the lazy dog.
• my faxed joke won a paper in th cable tv quiz show. the quick brown fox jumps
over the lazy dog.
Figure 4.8: Comparisons of typed text and eavesdropped text. The upper letters are what we
typed and lower letters are what were eavesdropped.
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Table 4.2: Error rate.
Distance [m] 0.5 1.0 1.5
# of characters typed 100 92 97
# of characters succeeded to decode 100 92 96
Error rate [%] 0 0 1.03
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Discussion
We demonstrated that RFRA enables an attacker to steal the signal transmitted through a
cable by merely attaching an FET to the cable. Although RFRA is an attack that does not
work unless an attacker irradiates radio waves, it has several advantages:
• As FET is a tiny element, it can be embedded into the wide varieties of devices.
• Because FET is tiny, no one will notice that a FET chip is embedded, if it is embedded
in the manufacturing stage.
• Because an RFRA circuit does not act as a standalone malicious system, it is difficult to
find its existence in the absence of attack activity.
As the target-side gimmick is just to install a FET chip in a cable, an audio cable, for
example, could be a target of the attack. Since it is not necessary to attach a device to
eavesdrop the signal and transmit it, it will simply look like a normal cable.
As we mentioned above, defending against the attack is not easy because it is infeasible to
detect the embedded small hardware trojans. One possible solution is to detect a malicious
circuit in the physical layer. Gerdes [18] proposes a countermeasure for detecting hardware key
loggers. The key idea of their approach was to leverage the observation that the installation of
a hardware key logger affects the electrical characteristics of the system it is attached to. We
note, however, that this approach may not be directly applicable to the detection of RFRA
hardware trojan because it will be installed at the time of manufacturing, making it difficult
to compare the electrical characteristics before and after the installation. Another possible
solution is to monitor malicious/reflected RF signals. However, as installing additional sensors
may increase the cost of manufacturing, the solution will not be adopted by manufacturers,
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given the fact that RFRA is a proof-of-concept attack. Of course, as this paper has proven the
feasibility of the attack, there could be a possibility that the threat of RFRA becomes manifest
in the future. Further study is necessary to develop the effective countermeasures against the
attack.
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Related works
There have been many studies on passive electromagnetic side-channel attacks [1, 2, 3, 4].
In [1], Hayashi et al. leveraged EM emanation from a targeted table PC to recover the screen
image. In [2], Schulz et al. monitored radiated electromagnetic fields around an Ethernet cable
to eavesdrop Ethernet communications.
As we mentioned in Section 1, however, there have been very few studies on the active
electromagnetic side-channel attacks. Although prior studies [5, 6] refer to the attack, its
mechanism and feasibility has not been tested in a systematic manner there. There is a room
for further research on active electromagnetic side-channel attacks. We hope this work becomes
a stepping stone to attract more researchers in this field.
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Conclusion
Through the extensive experiments, we have evaluated the approximate limit of Radio-frequency
(RF) retroreflector attack (RFRA). We also tested the application of RFRA by prototyping
an RFRA-enabled USB cable. Given the experimental results, we conclude that the RFRA is
feasible.
As we have shown, the mechanism of the signal leakage part of RFRA is very simple, and it
consists of a small FET chip and an antenna, which is one of the cables used in a target, e.g.,
a shielded wire. A FET chip is so tiny that it is difficult for a targeted user to notice that it
is embedded. It is also noteworthy that the cost needed for the attack was within USD 5,000.
With our configuration of USD 5,000, the attack succeeded up to 10 m, and the attackable
communication speed was up to about 10 Mbps. Since the distance depends on the radio field
strength and the communication speed depends on the sampling rate of USRP, it is expected
that this limit can be extended by upgrading the equipment.
Finally, we note that RFRA can target not only digital signals but also analog signals such
as acoustic signals. Studying other applications of RFRA and their countermeasures is left
for further study. We hope that the threat of RFRA encourages developers of transmission
protocols and corresponding devices to be aware of the fact that even though a signal is
transmitted through a wired cable, it could be leaked if an attacker embeds Trojan hardware
like RFRA in advance.
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